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ARTICLES 
The power of  suggestion 
Disclosure ideologies and medically assisted death 
Mara Buchbinder 
Abstract  
This article examines an ethical controversy that has received relatively little attention in 
public debates about the legalization of medical aid-in-dying (AID): should physicians 
inform patients that they have the option of hastening death? Drawing on ethnographic 
research about the implementation of AID in Vermont, I argue that how we understand the 
moral stakes of this debate depends on divergent views regarding language use in social 
interactions. Some stakeholders in this debate view a physician’s words as powerful enough 
to damage the patient-physician relationship or to influence a patient to hasten her death, 
while others believe that merely informing patients about AID cannot move them to act 
against their own values and preferences. I illustrate how these divergent perspectives are 
tied to competing language ideologies regarding clinical disclosure, which I call ‘disclosure 
ideologies’. My analysis of these two disclosure ideologies surrounding AID highlights 
disclosure practices in medicine as a rich site for medical anthropological theorizing on 
linguistic performativity and the social power of clinical language.  
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In 2015, Beth Neill’s ninety-year-old mother was hospitalized at a rehabilitation center in 
Berlin, Vermont, for recovery from a fall. During her four-month stay, clinicians at the 
facility regularly informed Neill’s mother that she had the option of ending her life under 
Vermont’s Patient Choice and Control at End of Life Act, or Act 39, as it’s known in the 
state. The law, similar to statutes in six other United States jurisdictions, permits physicians 
to write a lethal dose of medication to a mentally competent and terminally ill adult patient 
for the purpose of ending the patient’s life. According to Neill, her mother clearly indicated 
that she was not interested in Act 39 and felt pressured by the staff’s repeatedly introducing 
the topic. Even after her mother was transferred to a different assisted-living facility, she 
remained deeply suspicious that health care workers there would try to push assisted dying 
on her.1 
This story was recounted to me no less than five times during my first few weeks of 
ethnographic fieldwork in Vermont. In my project, The Vermont Study on Aid-in-Dying 
(Vermont SAID), I followed the social life of Act 39 across a variety of medical, legal, and 
advocacy settings between 2015 and 2017. The account circulated rapidly through advocacy 
circles and attained a remarkable notoriety after Neill shared it with a state legislator who had 
opposed Act 39. It offers a cautionary tale regarding an ethical question that has received 
relatively little attention in the ongoing public conversation about medical aid-in-dying (AID, 
also known as ‘assisted suicide’)2 in the United States: should physicians inform patients that 
they have the option of hastening death if their state has legalized AID? In Vermont, debates 
over this issue culminated in a 2016 lawsuit by several conservative physicians’ groups 
against the Vermont Board of Medical Practice and Office of Professional Regulation. The 
plaintiffs alleged that Act 39 required physicians to inform terminally ill patients that AID 
was a legal option in Vermont, and that this violated their constitutionally protected right to 
 
1 Neill was quoted on the website of True Dignity Vermont (2015), a Vermont-based grassroots advocacy 
organization that opposes assisted suicide (in their terms).  
2 Historically, what I call here ‘aid-in-dying’ was known as physician-assisted suicide (PAS), but proponents 
introduced alternative labels, such as ‘death with dignity’ and ‘physician aid-in-dying’ (PAD), because 
they found the language of suicide offensive and inaccurate in cases in which death is inevitable. 
Opponents view such labels as euphemistic and misleading, and continue to use ‘PAS’. These labels 
thus index meaningful social, political, and moral values for advocates on both sides of the debate. 
Because I have tried to maintain a neutral stance on the ethics and politics of assisted dying and I 
remain somewhat ambivalent about the practice, this fraught language has presented me with a 
conundrum in my research. Ultimately, I use the term ‘AID’ out of deference to AID advocates, for 
whom the stakes of avoiding suicide stigma seem more consequential, in my view, than the moral 
stakes of their opponents. I also prefer ‘AID’ to ‘PAD’ because it decenters the role of physicians in 
medical aid-in-dying and acknowledges that other health care providers play a role in helping patients 
navigate the process.  
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free speech. Although the lawsuit was eventually dismissed – because the state argued that 
Act 39 held no such affirmative duty to inform – questions remain about physicians’ clinical 
and moral responsibilities in the evolving landscape of medically assisted death.  
For opponents of AID, the fact that Beth Neill’s mother was ineligible for Act 39 – she had 
no terminal diagnosis and was in relatively good health for her age – served as alarming 
evidence that AID laws are ripe for misunderstanding, abuse, and the coercion of vulnerable 
groups, such as the elderly.3 For proponents, the story represented a sensationalized account 
that likely reflected misunderstanding on the part of the rehab center’s employees or Neill’s 
mother herself. However, even some proponents of AID are ambivalent about whether 
physicians should inform patients that AID is an option. Regardless of whether or not 
Neill’s story is true, its circulation and performative effects highlight the cultural significance 
of the debate about the ethics of informing patients about AID.  
Many physicians who support AID argue that communication about AID should always be 
initiated by patients because they believe that informing patients about AID may be harmful 
in certain circumstances. Patients may view this information as communicating the 
physician’s endorsement of AID or signaling a loss of hope or abandonment, and may cause 
patients who hold conflicting values to lose trust in their physician; in addition, physicians 
may worry that simply introducing the option could constitute undue influence on patients’ 
decisions (Buchbinder 2017). From this perspective, informing patients about AID may not 
be in the patient’s ‘best interest’ (Rodriguez 2018), despite widely shared views in US 
medicine about patients’ rights to health-related information.  
In this article, I argue that how we understand the moral stakes of physician-initiated 
conversations about AID depends on local theories of language as social action – that is, 
ideas about what speech can do in the clinical arena – that are not adequately addressed 
through a bioethical frame. For some, the view that a physician’s words could be powerful 
enough to damage the patient-physician relationship or influence a patient to hasten her 
death is a potent deterrent from recommending that a physician ever initiate a discussion of 
AID unless a patient first requests it. For others, however, merely informing patients about 
AID cannot move them to act against their own values and preferences. My aim here is not 
to adjudicate these viewpoints and determine whether or not informing patients about AID 
is ethical. Instead, I illustrate how divergent perspectives on the duty to inform reveal key 
metalinguistic claims about the social function of language (see Carr 2006). These claims, in 
 
3 Bioethicists worry that elderly patients may be vulnerable both to pressure from family members to hasten 
death involuntarily and to the influence of physicians.  
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turn, underlie competing language ideologies regarding clinical disclosure, which I call 
‘disclosure ideologies’.  
In the next section, I discuss the concept of disclosure ideology, integrating relevant 
anthropological scholarship on disclosure in biomedicine with theoretical perspectives on 
linguistic performativity. Then, after providing some background on my research methods, I 
discuss health care providers’ views on informing patients about AID and show how their 
perspectives are tied to competing disclosure ideologies and metalinguistic claims. Finally, I 
turn to two ethnographic cases in which physicians chose to proactively inform a terminally 
ill patient about AID, with starkly different results. My analysis highlights a disjuncture 
between two distinct views of clinical communication, as either a neutral vehicle for sharing 
information or as a dynamic context for the performative act of informing.  
Disclosure and language ideologies in biomedicine  
Medical anthropological perspectives on clinical disclosure – the act of naming disease or 
offering a prognosis – have highlighted how clinical practices surrounding disclosure are 
culturally and historically situated. As such, they reflect broader values and assumptions 
regarding privacy, relationality, autonomy, and medical authority. In 1927, the physician 
Joseph Collins published a provocative essay in Harper’s Magazine in which he argued that 
diagnostic disclosure practices in medicine should be governed by a strong paternalism. 
Citing numerous examples of patients whose health quickly deteriorated following the 
disclosure of a life-limiting diagnosis, Collins concluded that withholding the truth is not 
only compassionate but also protective. He mused, ‘The longer I practice medicine the more 
I am convinced that every physician should cultivate lying as a fine art’ (Collins [1927] 1999, 
502).  
Medical perspectives in the United States have evolved considerably since Collins’s time, 
particularly since the 1990 Patient Self-Determination Act established that patients have a 
right to make decisions about their medical care, and, therefore, to be informed about their 
medical conditions. Outside the United States, clinical disclosure practices surrounding 
cancer and HIV have also changed over the past several decades, from unilateral 
concealment to nuanced indirection (Wood and Lambert 2008), heterogeneous practices 
within the same society (Gordon and Paci 1997; Elwyn et al. 2002), and events that evolve 
over time and across multiple clinical encounters (Brada 2013; Dima et al. 2014). However, 
Collins’s ([1927] 1999) underlying point – the idea that clinical disclosure may have powerful 
social and embodied effects – still holds tremendous cross-cultural currency. 
Social scientists have examined the social power of clinical disclosure, showing that receiving 
a serious diagnosis can transform one’s understandings of self and identity; afford one 
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certain bureaucratic, social, and economic entitlements; and reshape one’s vision for the 
future (Aronowitz 1998; Dumit 2006; Jutel 2011). Genetic diagnosis, in particular, can 
medicalize kinship and cause dramatic shifts in subjectivity for presymptomatic persons 
(Konrad 2003; Lock et al. 2007), turning them into ‘patients-in-waiting’ (Timmermans and 
Buchbinder 2010). Yet nowhere is the social power of clinical disclosure more pronounced 
or feared than in the realm of terminal illness.  
In Death Foretold, the sociologist and physician Nicholas Christakis (1999) observes that many 
American physicians adhere to an implicit norm of not communicating predictions unless 
asked to do so. They follow this norm because they believe – like Collins – that predictions 
can affect therapeutic outcomes through a type of self-fulfilling prophecy. One young 
general internist in Christakis’s ethnographic study reported, ‘The words coming out of my 
mouth feel like a proclamation. They can make things happen’ (Christakis 1999, 179). 
Christakis identifies several possible mechanisms for such effects, including changing the 
physician’s attitudes or behaviors, changing the patient’s attitudes or behaviors, and a quasi-
magical mechanism, similar to ‘voodoo death’ (Cannon 1942), to which many physicians 
subscribed. Ultimately, Christakis argues that a belief in the self-fulfilling prophecy is a major 
cause of what Fox (1988) has called the ‘ritualization of optimism’ in American medicine: the 
tendency for medical professionals to express optimism about the likelihood of therapeutic 
efficacy, even when a positive outcome is extremely unlikely. 
Because clinical disclosure is credited with the power to transform the patient’s experience 
of illness, for better or worse, its practice invites us to consider theoretical perspectives on 
linguistic performativity. The concept of linguistic performativity acknowledges that 
language, more than just a neutral container for transmitting ideas, is also a form of social 
action (see Duranti 1997, 214–44). According to the philosopher of language J. L. Austin 
([1962] 1975), in saying something we are always also doing something. This pragmatic view 
of language asserts a distinction between a statement’s meaning and force. For clinical 
disclosure, this distinction is between the propositional content of a diagnostic utterance and 
the action performed by uttering it within a clinical encounter. 
To the extent that language can act in the world, however, such actions are always 
constrained by language ideologies: culturally informed, common-sense beliefs and 
assumptions about language use within a particular context (Irvine 1989; Woolard and 
Schieffelin 1994). Anthropologists have critiqued Austin’s speech act theory for failing to 
acknowledge its contextual specificity with respect to English-language ideologies and 
Western cultural models of the person (Rosaldo 1982). In this way, language ideologies 
reflect much more than understandings of language per se. Their enactments also provide a 
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rich source of information about social norms, hierarchy, identity, and social reproduction 
and change within a cultural system.  
As a ‘mediating link between social structures and forms of talk’ (Woolard and Schieffelin 
1994, 55), the concept of language ideology has been particularly useful for bridging micro-
interactional and macro-structural analytic perspectives on clinical communication and the 
performative effects of biomedical language (Briggs 2005; Pigg 2001). In this article, 
‘disclosure ideology’ refers to a specific subset of language ideologies governing clinical 
disclosure, and ‘the power of suggestion’ denotes a particular disclosure ideology about the 
potentially negative effects of informing patients about AID. 
Brada (2013) describes a practice of ‘disclosure catechism’ in which children with HIV in 
Botswana were expected to engage in repeated paired question/response sequences about 
the biological mechanisms of HIV.4 Children recited disease-related knowledge with 
increasing sophistication and specificity over time, as clinicians gradually replaced 
euphemisms with scientific terminology in a stepwise progression, until they eventually 
acknowledged that the ‘bad guy’ of their earlier catechisms was HIV. According to Brada, 
this practice was motivated by two underlying ideological assumptions: that accurate self-
knowledge would combat stigma and arm children to take better care of themselves, and that 
using the term ‘HIV/AIDS’ too early was dangerous and could potentially stymie self-care 
(see also Black 2015). These assumptions were driven in turn by a US-centric HIV-treatment 
agenda that viewed Botswana’s culture of silence around HIV as an inciting factor in its 
epidemic.  
Underpinning Brada’s analysis are two disclosure ideologies common in US medical cultures. 
First is the notion that narrativizing one’s distress and suffering produces self-understanding 
and, in turn, clinical benefits; this idea asserts a metacommunicative claim about the 
therapeutic power of language. Carr (2006, 245) observes that ‘the talking cure is based on 
the assumption that words can do much more than refer to sick selves; they can also 
produce healthier ones’. The corollary of this idea, that ‘secrets keep you sick’, informs 
therapeutic approaches across a variety of clinical settings (see, for example, Carr 2006, 2011; 
Shohet 2007; Young 1993; Waldram 2012). As Young (1993) points out, however, the power 
of narrative to produce recovery lies in the ideological nature of the relationship between 
mental disorders and self-knowledge. From this perspective, language itself does not 
necessarily heal; instead, people learn how to tell the right narratives to present themselves as 
therapeutically transformed. 
 
4 See also Fainzang (2016, 28) regarding the role of repetition in diagnostic disclosure in a French clinical 
context.  
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I encountered the second idea – that clinical disclosure might be dangerous and even 
injurious to patients – in my earlier study of the politics of scripted speech in state-mandated 
abortion counseling; there, abortion providers expressed concerns that some of the required 
disclosures were explicitly designed to produce fear and shame in women seeking abortion 
(Buchbinder 2016). Similarly, in her ethnographic study of lying in a French hospital, 
Fainzang (2016) found that French physicians frequently hesitated to give patients bad 
prognoses because of concerns about their potential psychological responses, including the 
possibility that patients might commit suicide if they were to find out the truth.  
The tension between these two prevalent ideologies, which respectively favor revealing and 
concealing, highlights that disclosure is delicate and interpersonally fraught. Drawing on 
research in India, Van Hollen (2017, 67) argues that it is more important to understand the 
relational dynamics responsible for either sharing or withholding information than it is to 
know whether or not physicians disclose a prognosis: ‘My research suggests that whether 
cancer patients or their family members looked favorably or critically on the practice of 
nondisclosure, their primary concern was about the quality of care that nondisclosure symbolized rather 
than about the content of the information and its usefulness for health-seeking decision-
making purposes or the trauma that it might produce’ (emphasis in original). Gordon and 
Paci (1997) similarly argue that apparent contradictions in disclosure practices may arise 
from multiple conflicting ideological frames; therefore, they suggest that the cultural 
meaning and intent of disclosure matter as much as outcomes.  
These insights regarding the relational context of clinical disclosure are particularly 
instructive for my purposes here. Bioethical debates about a patient’s ‘right to know’ 
pertinent health information often turn on considerations of individual rights, including the 
protection of people who may wish not to know (Konrad 2003; Sperling 2008). Yet 
anthropologists and sociologists have argued that models of bioethical decision making tend 
to privilege patient autonomy above other values and, in doing so, construe patients as 
isolated individuals decontextualized from their webs of social relations (Fox and Swazey 
1984; Kleinman 1997). If autonomous decision making is privileged, threats to patient 
autonomy and vulnerability to coercion are most in need of protection in AID-related 
disclosure. However, as I will show, other relational factors may be equally significant.  
In what follows, I shift attention from the question of whether or not there is such a ‘right to 
know’ that AID is a legally authorized option. Instead, I explore how disclosures of 
information, like the option of AID, are shaped by the power dynamics of the clinical 
encounter and reverberate through the social and moral worlds of terminally ill people. 
Because eligibility for AID requires that one be deemed terminally ill, such disclosures are 
always already embedded in broader prognostic judgments about ‘time left’ (Kaufman 2009). 
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I argue that the moral stakes of such disclosures are more complex than the question of 
one’s ‘right’ to information, and instead depend on uncertainties surrounding the 
performative context of informing.  
Background and methods 
Vermont passed Act 39 in 2013, becoming the fourth state in the United States to legalize 
AID. Other states include Oregon (1997), Washington (2008), Montana (2009), California 
(2015), Colorado (2016), and Hawaii (2018), as well as the District of Columbia (2016). Act 
39 defines a terminal illness as one in which death is expected within six months. The law 
also contains several provisions and safeguards to ensure that participation is voluntary for 
both patients and physicians, and that the patient’s choice remains stable over time. In 
addition, patients must be capable of making an informed decision; patients must be 
Vermont residents; patients must make two oral requests, spaced fifteen days apart, as well 
as a written request signed in the presence of two witnesses; the patient’s prognosis and 
eligibility must be confirmed by a second physician; and the medication must be self-
administered.5 The Vermont Department of Health has released limited information about 
the utilization of Act 39 in its first four years. During this time, paperwork for fifty-two cases 
was filed, and twenty-nine people had utilized the lethal prescription as of January 2018; 
forty-eight had a death certificate on file, meaning that nineteen had died without ingesting 
the medication (Vermont Department of Heath 2018). The most common diagnoses were 
cancer (n=43) and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) (n=7). The number of physicians who 
have participated has not been published.  
My primary data include in-depth interviews with 144 Vermont residents – including 
physicians, nurses, patients, caregivers for terminally ill patients, activists, legislators, and 
other policy stakeholders – about their perspectives on and experiences with the law. 
Included among my participants were twenty-seven caregivers of eighteen terminally ill 
patients who sought to use Act 39 (twelve of whom ultimately ingested the medication), and 
eighteen physicians who had participated in Act 39 as a prescribing or secondary physician. I 
also conducted participant observation at professional conferences and workshops, judicial 
hearings, and community education and advocacy events.  
A professional transcriptionist transcribed interview recordings verbatim, after which two 
research assistants and I deidentified interview transcripts and ethnographic fieldnotes and 
 
5 Vermont Patient Choice and Control at End of Life Act (Act 39), VT Statutes Annotated Sec. 1. 18 V.S.A. 
chapter 113. http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2014/Acts/ACT039.pdf. 
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analyzed them using an inductive, thematic approach and NVivo 11 Software. We organized 
emergent themes into a structured coding dictionary that included a definition for each of 
forty-four codes. Codes were then assigned to excerpts of interview text that matched the 
code definition by two coders, each blinded to the other’s work. Research design and 
methods are described in more detail elsewhere (Buchbinder 2018a, 2018b). For this analysis, 
I focus on the ‘duty to inform’ code. The study received Institutional Review Board 
Approval from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
The power of suggestion  
In February 2018, I participated in a workshop at the National Academies of Science, 
Engineering, and Medicine designed to explore the evidence base and research gaps 
pertaining to the clinical implementation of physician-assisted death in the United States. A 
key message of my brief presentation was to challenge conventional approaches to 
communication about assisted dying. Professional medical guidelines on AID are often 
premised on an unstated assumption that any conversation about AID ought to begin with a 
patient’s request; this is evident in the guidelines’ focus on responding to requests, rather 
than communication about AID more generally (Quill, Back, and Block 2016). I had grown 
suspicious of this starting assumption because my research had demonstrated stark 
inequalities in access to Act 39, including different levels of awareness of AID as a legally 
authorized option (Buchbinder 2018a). Having had multiple opportunities to explain to 
strangers or acquaintances with no connection to Act 39 just what I was doing in Vermont 
over the course of my fieldwork, I knew that the general public was not well informed about 
Act 39’s requirements or affordances. As a medical anthropologist, I also knew that power 
imbalances in the patient-physician relationship might make patients from racial/ethnic 
minorities or socioeconomically marginalized groups feel uncomfortable initiating such 
requests (Dubbin, Chang, and Shim 2013; Kuipers 1989; Lazarus 1988). For these reasons, it 
seemed likely to me that waiting for a patient to request AID would reinforce access 
disparities by making it more available to affluent, well-educated, white patients (Buchbinder 
2017).6 While I acknowledged the potential sensitivity of a physician initiating a conversation 
 
6 It is worth noting here that Vermont’s population is 95 percent white, so racial diversity among patients 
accessing AID is not to be expected.  
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about hastening death, I suggested that there might be situations in which it would be 
appropriate for a physician to do so.7  
I recognized that my ideas would be controversial, not only because US physicians are 
notorious for avoiding death talk but also because the notion of mitigating access barriers 
for the poor challenged the logic of longstanding concerns that socioeconomically 
marginalized groups may be vulnerable to coercion in the context of AID. Nevertheless, I 
was surprised when a member of the planning committee said, as part of his summary 
remarks, ‘it was clear from the presentations . . . that patients must opt in rather than be 
offered these services by providers’ (NASEM 2018, 7-3). I understood his point about 
‘offering’ to mean that physicians should not inform qualifying patients about AID, but 
should rather wait for them to ‘opt in’, presumably by making a request. This comment 
seemed to disregard the central thrust of my remarks, quoted in the summary report for the 
meeting, that ‘we need to be thinking about “circumstances in which it might be ethically 
permissible for physicians and nurses to inform qualifying patients about aid-in-dying”’ 
(NASEM 2018, 3-14). Conventional disclosure ideologies around AID, it appears, are quite 
tenacious. 
In my interviews, physicians and nurses articulated a range of reasons for avoiding such 
discussions unless initiated by a patient, yet most of their concerns focused on the potential 
for harm to the patient-provider relationship or the potential to influence the patient’s 
decision-making process. Ruby Cooper, an oncology clinic nurse coordinator, explained to 
me, ‘We never bring it up. It’s something that somebody else brings up with you’. When I 
asked her why, she elaborated:  
I think you have to be careful about how people feel about this. And let’s say, for 
example, that you have a relationship with the patient and the family, and it’s a 
comforting, trusting relationship and they happen to be individuals who are 
completely against this. If I bring that up and it’s something that they wouldn’t even 
consider, that could create a huge scar in that relationship. And so, again, they can 
bring it up and then you know that the door is open to that conversation. But unless 
that door was opened, I would not bring it up to a patient.  
 
7 While this position will likely strike some readers as overly prescriptive, I see my contribution to this debate 
as a form of anthropological critique – insofar as I have drawn attention to the unexamined 
assumptions inherent in the conventional wisdom around waiting for a patient’s request – and not as 
taking a moral stance on the practice of AID itself. The view that physicians should potentially, under 
certain circumstances, inform patients about AID in jurisdictions where it is legal is not incompatible 
with my underlying ambivalence about whether AID constitutes good public policy.  
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Ruby suggested that mentioning AID as an end-of-life option with a patient who opposed 
the practice could irreparably damage the patient-provider relationship. If this conversation 
was a kind of a passageway to a new stage of end-of-life counseling, Ruby would not step 
over the threshold unless the patient first welcomed her in.  
Dr. Alanna Reynolds, a hospice physician who had prescribed under Act 39 and described 
herself as an AID advocate, was more ambivalent than Ruby.8 Ultimately, however, she 
came down on the side of not informing patients due to concerns about her potential 
influence.  
I’ll think to myself, ‘Should I bring up Act 39?’ And then I feel conflicted about it 
because I feel like it’s a really patient-driven thing, and so I don’t want to bring it up 
to them. I don’t want them to feel like what they’re going through isn’t valuable. So, I 
don’t typically – I will bring it up if people are asking questions that kind of indicate 
that they’ve reached a point – I try not to bring it up directly, actually, because I don’t 
want to influence people.  
Both Ruby and Dr. Reynolds were committed advocates; their objections were not to Act 39 
itself, but rather to informing patients about it. While Ruby focused on the relational 
implications of introducing a culturally and morally contested topic, Dr. Reynolds worried 
about potentially contaminating the decision-making process. Although she stopped short of 
describing such conversations as coercive, the specter of coercion nevertheless threads 
through her remarks. In both cases, concerns about the performative effects of clinical 
language and the possibility for harm, which I gloss here as ‘the power of suggestion’, 
animate their moral reasoning and their stance on informing.  
On the other hand, many of the physicians I interviewed indicated that there were 
circumstances in which they might initiate a discussion of AID as an option in the absence 
of a patient’s request.9 While some indicated that these circumstances would be somewhat 
unusual (for example, a patient threatening to shoot himself), others brought it up more 
regularly, as part of the ‘slate of options’, as one physician put it. In justifying this approach, 
several providers specifically mentioned concerns about patients’ access to information. Dr. 
Lila Maupin, a family physician, said, ‘Sometimes different topics make me, as a provider, 
 
8 See Buchbinder (2018b) for a fuller discussion of hospice policies around Act 39.  
9 Out of twenty nurse practitioners and physicians in the Vermont study sample who discussed their 
informing practices in their interviews, twelve indicated that they initiate discussion about AID with 
patients at least some of the time (Brassfield and Buchbinder, n.d.).  
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uncomfortable to bring [it] up, but I know I need to, and it’s [in] the best interest [of] the 
patient. . . . With really obese patients, I bring up bariatric surgery, but they won’t bring it up 
sometimes, but I feel obligated to offer them that’. While Dr. Maupin acknowledged that 
AID and bariatric surgery are very different, she suggested that physicians may avoid both 
topics due to their own discomfort, which might not be in the patient’s best interest.  
These divergent perspectives on informing patients about AID are tied to competing 
language ideologies surrounding clinical communication. Some physicians, like Dr. Maupin, 
focus on the content of clinical communication, emphasizing their responsibility to convey 
information to patients so that they can make informed decisions about their care. This 
perspective regards language as a relatively neutral vehicle for transmitting health-related 
information. Others, like Ruby Cooper and Dr. Reynolds, view clinical communication as an 
arena for a dynamic, performative act (informing), expressing legitimate concerns about the 
possibility of harm.  
That these divergent perspectives denote distinct ideologies of clinical speech is underscored 
by the different language employed by representatives of each viewpoint. Notice that the 
physician at the National Academies workshop maintained that assisted death cannot be 
‘offered’ to patients. In defending the same position, Cohen-Almogar (2003, 97) poses the 
question of ‘whether a physician should suggest euthanasia to his or her patients’ (emphasis 
added):  
With respect to professional ethics, talking about euthanasia upon a patient’s request 
is different from suggesting it to the patient. By suggesting euthanasia to a patient, the 
physician implicitly includes euthanasia in the canon of proffered rational treatment 
options. In light of the professional authority that she is offering, she thereby 
establishes euthanasia as a rule, and not as an exception. This conduct conflicts much 
more with the role of the physician as a healer than it is the case if the physician talks 
about euthanasia upon the patient’s request.  
In this account, Cohen-Almogar casts informing as suggesting and concludes that 
‘suggesting’ communicates an implicit endorsement, thereby changing the scope of the 
physician’s role as healer. At the same time, it appears that discussing euthanasia ‘upon a 
patient’s request’ is morally uncomplicated for him. Yet Cohen-Almogar does not address 
the power dynamics that might constrain the patient’s capacity to initiate a such a request. I 
would argue that professional authority is not ‘offered’ by the physician, as Cohen-Almogar 
proposes. Instead, it is structured into the power dynamics of the clinical encounter, in 
which a terminally ill patient is inescapably vulnerable. Such dynamics can make it very 
challenging for a patient to make such a sensitive and potentially stigmatizing request. If 
physicians are concerned about the relational fallout of introducing the option of AID, it is 
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important to remember that such consequences could easily cut both ways; a patient’s 
request might ultimately be just as damaging to the patient-provider relationship as a 
physician’s introducing the topic.10  
Moreover, ‘informing’, ‘offering’, and ‘suggesting’ are distinct speech acts that differentially 
construe the speaker’s agency and intentions with respect to the information being 
conveyed. While a physician may ‘inform’ patients about an option to which she remains 
neutral, to ‘suggest’ something implies a preference for a certain outcome, and ‘offering’ 
implies a gift, which comes with an expectation of acceptance. The selection of each of these 
terms thus encodes a bias about the metacommunicative function of clinical language. In 
other words, to speak of ‘offering’ or ‘suggesting’ AID implies that the physician can never 
merely inform because of her social influence.  
Austin’s ([1962] 1975) distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts can help to 
illuminate this point: informing is an illocutionary act with a conventional force, while the 
perlocutionary act is an action we bring about by informing. For example, suggesting may be 
the perlocutionary act brought about by informing. As Austin ([1962] 1975, 110) explains: 
‘We must distinguish the illocutionary from the perlocutionary act: for example we must 
distinguish “in saying it I was warning him” from “by saying it I convinced him, or surprised 
him, or got him to stop”’. Aligning with Austin’s argument, many physicians and bioethicists 
are skeptical that one can inform patients about AID without uncontrollable perlocutionary 
effects.  
On the other hand, if we accept that clinical communication about AID must begin with a 
patient’s request, we must acknowledge that a request, too, is a specific kind of speech act 
that may be more felicitous in certain circumstances and among certain kinds of actors. 
Fainzang’s (2016) ethnography of lying in a French hospital reveals that, while doctors may 
believe that patients should only be informed to the extent that they want to be, many 
patients report not knowing whether or how to ask for such information. Waiting for 
patients to make a request only makes sense within a context in which patients feel 
empowered to make such requests of their health care providers – and one in which 
providers are willing to listen and respond.  
 
10 For example, several activists from my study commented to me that they had broached the topic of AID 
with their primary care physicians, although they were not currently ill, and knew that they would 
eventually need to find new physicians due to their physicians’ opposition. Such examples make clear 
that asking about AID is morally loaded, with potentially powerful consequences.  
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In order to understand the social, ethical, and linguistic stakes of informing patients and 
families about Act 39 in Vermont, I now turn to two ethnographic cases that showcase what 
happened when a physician informed a patient of the option of an assisted death. In neither 
case was the patient inclined toward AID, and in both cases family members responded with 
serious concerns. Therefore, these are cases in which concerns about the potential for harm 
were warranted. Nevertheless, their outcomes illustrate that quite different possibilities are 
created when people are exposed to information. This underscores that informing patients 
about AID may yield different perlocutionary effects. As I will show, these possibilities 
depend on the relational context of informing as much as the referential content of the 
information expressed. 
‘God’s time’ 
The first thing that I noticed about Cora Tremblay when she opened the door to her cream-
colored single-story home was that she was not dressed in the plain, utilitarian style I had 
come to expect from Vermonters. Rather than sandals and jeans, Cora wore a calf-length fit-
and-flare dress, hosiery, and a light cardigan sweater. Her outfit was finished with a 
lightweight patterned scarf, a pearl-encrusted necklace, and bright lipstick. She smiled 
warmly and led me through the kitchen, where a simple wooden cross adorned one wall, to a 
sunlit sitting room at the back of the house. There, she recounted the story of her husband’s 
illness and death over an emotionally charged two-hour interview.  
Cora’s husband, Arnold, had died from terminal cancer the previous spring, after outliving 
his initial prognosis by many months. Arnold had been proud of reporting that he had 
‘flunked hospice’. Following a protracted hospitalization and near-death experience, his 
symptoms stabilized and he returned home to Cora’s care, and was even disqualified from 
hospice. Eventually, however, the cancer spread to his brain and bones. Arnold’s primary 
care physician, Dr. Greg Wright, warned Cora that a steep decline was likely, with a strong 
possibility of seizures and falls in the weeks leading up to death.  
Around this time, Cora recalled, Dr. Wright ‘presented [Act 39] as an option’. At a time 
when Arnold was running out of options, he was reassured to have a fresh one. Cora 
explained:  
When it was presented, Arnold said, ‘it is an option’ – and he had explored every 
option available. Experimental research, anything the doctors told him, 
chemotherapy, radiation, surgeries, medication at home, injections, and he was in four 
different hospitals. . . . So, it was an option and I agreed to have – Arnold said, ‘We 
could have it in the house, I just, I just want it as an option. I may not exercise the 
option. It’s an option’.  
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For Cora, who hailed ‘from a family of faith’, the idea of hastening death was inimical to her 
conservative Christian worldview. She explained, ‘I believe in a natural – that, to let God 
take [Arnold] up in His time. I’m a religious person’. Cora and Arnold had both opposed Act 
39. However, Cora’s commitment to her husband and her strong desire to honor his wishes 
outweighed her reservations. With a great deal of reluctance, she filled the lethal prescription 
and agreed to keep it in the house. She knew that Arnold found it reassuring to have the 
medication in the house, and she herself was reassured by the possibility that he might never 
decide to use it. To forestall such a decision, Cora made sure that Arnold’s pain was well 
medicated. She protected his dignity by helping him use the bathroom, so that he could 
avoid wearing diapers, and bathing him in an intimate manner without help from a home 
health nurse – an act that was physically taxing due to his large size, and that resulted in a 
long-term injury for Cora. Ultimately, Arnold died in his sleep, without taking the 
medication. Cora recounted: ‘He just went to sleep very peacefully. He had a very beautiful 
peaceful death and I’m comforted by that and it was a natural death and we did not use the 
Act 39’. 
After hearing Cora’s story, I was surprised that Dr. Wright would have initiated a 
conversation about AID with such a deeply religious couple. It was very unlikely that he 
would have been unaware of Arnold and Cora’s faith; it was evident to me within minutes of 
meeting Cora. Furthermore, Cora had told me that when Arnold had been receiving hospice 
services, and Dr. Wright had shared his uncertainty about how much time he had left, Cora 
had countered, ‘Well, we’re praying for Arnold, and he’ll die in God’s time’. Given the 
number of physicians who had reported to me that they would avoid discussing AID with a 
religious family out of fears of damaging the relationship, I asked Cora whether she was 
upset with Dr. Wright for mentioning Act 39. She responded:  
Oh, when he brought it up, was I upset? I was upset, but only as a conservative 
Christian. And then when Arnold said to me afterwards, ‘He’s just presenting an 
option’. Then I went back and read it online, and he’s a doctor in Vermont, so he’s 
presenting it as an option. And he’s a compassionate man. There’s no doubt he’s a 
compassionate man. I have no issues with Dr. Wright. I felt he was doing his job. No. 
The answer’s ‘no’.  
Cora firmly rejected my presupposition that Dr. Wright might have provoked harm by 
mentioning AID to her husband. Her response offers a striking rejoinder to the claim of 
some of my interlocutors that the topic of AID should be altogether avoided with religious 
patients. Concerns about the potential for harm to the patient-provider relationship were 
mitigated in Cora and Arnold’s case by their understanding that Dr. Wright was a 
compassionate and supportive physician. There was something unmistakably compassionate 
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about Dr. Wright’s giving Arnold more options (and perhaps some hope) at a time when 
other options were dissipating. And, it was because Dr. Wright was compassionate that Cora 
viewed the act of informing as within the scope of ‘doing his job’ and not an attempt to push 
his values on them.  
Given that much of the bioethical concern about informing crystallizes around the potential 
for undue influence, Cora and Arnold’s framing of Dr. Wright’s disclosure about Act 39 as 
‘presenting an option’, rather than ‘suggesting’ or ‘offering’, is reassuring. This linguistic 
choice suggests that they perceived Dr. Wright as having a neutral orientation to the 
information at hand, and to Arnold’s potential choice to hasten death. On the other hand, 
Cora also indicated that Arnold ‘did everything that was suggested to him’ by his doctors. 
For Arnold, AID was just one more health care option extended to him by a caring clinician, 
and he was averse to declining it. From this perspective, filling the lethal prescription was 
similar to countless other health care decisions over which physicians like Dr. Wright can 
exert a powerful influence.  
At the same time, having AID as an option restored Arnold’s capacity to make an active 
choice at a time when terminal illness was otherwise stripping away his agency. In this 
respect, the performative effects of informing were quite the opposite of those imagined by 
critics: rather than influencing Arnold to make a particular choice, Dr. Wright’s informing 
Arnold of this option helped to restore Arnold’s decisional agency. Ultimately, the 
availability of Act 39 enabled Arnold to choose against hastening death in a context in which 
few choices were desirable or possible (see also Norwood 2009).11 
Unintended effects 
‘Are you my interviewer?’ a bright-eyed, middle-aged woman asked warmly, sticking her head 
out from around the corner of the reception desk. It was a Monday at noon and the waiting 
room of the community-based neurology clinic had emptied out for lunch. She seemed 
amused by the fact that she had an interviewer, as if doubting that she had a story worth 
documenting. I said that I was, and she invited me into her office, which was small, yet 
homey, with antique furniture and a petite leather loveseat where I perched myself.  
 
11 The reassurance offered Arnold by having the medication on hand without ever ingesting it mirrors the 
findings from Norwood’s (2009) important ethnography on euthanasia in the Netherlands, in which 
she argues that euthanasia discourse only rarely culminates in euthanasia death, and that the cultural 
value of euthanasia functions more as a social discourse about control, independence, and the 
prevention of social death.  
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Dr. Terri Nichols was a strong proponent of Act 39, a fact that was well known in her local 
community. She did not have moral objections to AID, and believed that it was part of her 
job to ensure that it was done correctly. ‘If I can do it for a patient who really seeks it out 
and wants to do [it], I think it’s their right’, she explained. At the time of our interview, she 
had initiated the process three times, but in two cases it was not completed because the 
patient’s disease progressed too quickly.  
Dr. Nichols was frank about her commitment to informing patients about AID as a matter 
of routine practice. ‘I think I want my patients to understand everything that’s available and I 
don’t think it’s fair to leave a patient in the dark. Whether or not they want to do it or 
ethically agree with it is not the issue’, she said. The issue, instead, was the patient’s ‘right to 
know’. She subscribed to a disclosure ideology that emphasized the physician’s responsibility 
to convey all relevant information to patients. Her commitment to this viewpoint did not 
waver even after a challenging encounter in which a family member threatened her for 
initiating a conversation about Act 39. Dr. Nichols told me about the case of Ernestine 
Andrews, an elderly woman with cancer that had metastasized to her brain. After her 
oncologist told her that the brain tumors were inoperable, Ernestine came to see Dr. Nichols 
for control of her seizures. The doctor recounted the story for me as follows: 
She came with her little husband, they’re a very cute couple, and we’re talking about 
how to control the seizures, and what we might try, and what’s going on. And I said, 
‘You understand what this is, right, and you understand what the prognosis is, right?’ 
And they did, and we went over that before I even brought up the topic, and I said, 
‘So you need to also understand that in Vermont we have a law that should you feel 
that you want to access this law it’s there for you, and here is what the law is, right’. I 
didn’t say, ‘I think you should do this’, I didn’t say, ‘this is what I want you to do’, I 
didn’t say, ‘this is the right thing to do’. I said, ‘You could get hospice, but this is 
where we’re headed’. And it seemed like no one had made it really clear to this 
woman, even though they sent her to me after she had seen oncology, and 
neurosurgery, and had regrowth of tumor. No one had really, it seemed, made it very 
clear to her that you’re not going to live six months at this point, right, we’re at the 
end here and you’ve got to figure out what you’ve got to do and be prepared.  
This narrative reveals how the decision to introduce AID as an option is always embedded in 
larger decisions about prognostic disclosure, insofar as being eligible for Act 39 requires an 
acknowledgment that the patient is expected to die within six months. In this case, the 
Andrewses did not seem to have fully grasped her prognosis before Dr. Nichols mentioned 
AID. The couple did not signal a strong interest in AID, but they thanked her and said they 
would think about it. They decided how to treat the seizures and scheduled a follow-up 
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appointment. They had spent an hour and twenty minutes talking, and Dr. Nichols thought 
that they had established a good rapport. Several days later, however, Dr. Nichols received 
an angry telephone call from the couple’s daughter, which she recalled as follows: 
[Ernestine’s] daughter, who had found out [that I had mentioned AID] later from the 
daughter’s primary care doctor – the daughter is wacky – called me up, verbally 
threatening me on the phone, screaming at me on the phone. So I got on the phone 
and I heard her out that I’m the world’s worst doctor, and how dare I do this to her 
mother, and I ruined the rest of her mother’s life, and now her mother’s going down 
the tubes and it’s my fault, and, you know, she wants to know exactly what was said 
to her mother when her mother was here. So I said, ‘Okay if there’s a release signed 
by your mother or your father and they want me to talk to you about this, otherwise I 
can’t talk to you about this’. I heard everything she said, and I just kept saying, ‘if you 
get a release’. So she sent us a fake release that the mother didn’t sign, and she 
threatened to be outside waiting for me when I got out of the office. We had to get a 
restraining order against her. It was horrible. So she said, ‘I’m never letting my 
mother come back to see you’. They didn’t come back. But they also didn’t sign a 
release for her to talk to me. So it was really horrible. And, you know, so I really 
wished she had been with the parents the day they were here. So she could have 
heard, but I’m not allowed to say, ‘this is what happened’. So it was a really bad 
experience.  
The reaction from Ernestine’s daughter offers a critical challenge to the practice of 
affirmatively informing patients about AID prior to an explicit request. It is unclear whether 
Ernestine’s daughter was reacting to the suggestion that her mother might wish to pursue 
AID or to the upsetting realization that her mother’s death was imminent. In this respect, 
initiating a discussion about AID raises challenges similar to initiating a discussion of 
hospice, which can elicit negative reactions from patients and families because it signals the 
foreclosure of hope (Mrig and Spencer 2018). Even though Dr. Nichols apparently 
presented the information carefully, avoiding value judgments, the information took on a life 
of its own when it traveled outside of the clinical encounter. Despite Dr. Nichols’s sensitivity 
and the superficially successful clinical exchange, Ernestine never came back for help with 
her seizures, and Dr. Nichols was compelled to obtain a restraining order against Ernestine’s 
daughter. I wondered whether this experience had made Dr. Nichols more cautious about 
introducing the topic of AID, and asked her as much, but she said, ‘no’. ‘I don’t think it’s 
going to change what I do’, she said. ‘But it’s a little scary when people are threatening you’.  
Dr. Nichols felt she had a moral obligation to inform patients about what she viewed as an 
appealing end-of-life option:  
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My feeling is we see a lot of ugly death, we see a lot of suffering at the end of life. . . . 
I go to the people’s houses when they die, right? And so, having seen it, like I told 
you, with my friend, the ninety-two-year-old man who died, you’re very sure, you 
know, I wouldn’t do this to someone. I wouldn’t want another human being to suffer 
through this. They’re going to die anyway. Like if they had the choice to not have to 
do that, how dare I not offer that to them, right? 
This statement highlights how, for her, informing terminally ill patients about AID is not 
only a matter of upholding the possibility of choice but also of conveying compassion. In 
much the same way that Cora and Arnold extolled the benefits of having ‘an option’, Dr. 
Nichols’s disclosure ideology positions sharing information about AID as critical to 
supporting patients’ autonomy in end-of-life decision making and allowing them to avoid 
unnecessary suffering at the end of life.  
Nevertheless, the social and ethical risks of informing are high, and her account validates 
critics’ concerns regarding the risks of doing so. Informing Ernestine about AID set off a 
ripple of events that Dr. Nichols could hardly have anticipated, culminating with a legal 
intervention against her patient’s daughter. Given that Ernestine never returned, informing 
may also have caused irreparable damage to the patient-provider relationship.  
What lessons ought we to draw from this case? When we compare this clinical encounter to 
the long-term relationship between Dr. Wright and Arnold and Cora, it becomes clear that 
Dr. Nichols was missing pertinent information about the relational context of her disclosure. 
Because it was her first time meeting the couple, she was not attuned to the daughter’s 
absence as a possible source of relief or tension. When the daughter contacted her following 
the appointment, Dr. Nichols had no way of knowing whether or not Ernestine would have 
welcomed her daughter’s participation in the discussion about AID. The stressful aftermath 
of this encounter underscores the importance of carefully considering who is included in the 
clinical context of disclosure and with what possible effects. Conventional disclosure 
ideologies may overlook the fact that individuals are embedded in social relationships, and 
that information may come to be absorbed by social worlds beyond the discrete moment of 
the clinical encounter. Moreover, the fact that Dr. Nichols required a signed release to 
discuss this conversation with Ernestine’s daughter highlights that health care providers 
confront multiple medico-legal constraints on disclosure beyond contested ethical norms. 
Informing patients about AID is never isolated from the broader regulatory complex that 
governs contemporary biomedicine. 
The figure of the enraged daughter also exemplifies cultural concerns regarding older 
persons as particularly suggestible, and hence more vulnerable. The insinuation that 
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Ernestine went ‘down the tubes’ because of the clinical disclosure (and not because of her 
terminal cancer) aligns with cultural concerns about the power of suggestion. The notoriety 
and fears that attached to Beth Neill’s narrative of abuse underscores how older adults in the 
United States are often cast as particularly vulnerable to such influences. However, the type 
of influence at stake here does not assume a conventional bioethical form. The daughter’s 
concern was not that her mother was influenced to choose AID, but instead that she fell 
prey to a subtler form of suggestion: the self-fulfilling nature of a terminal prognosis 
(Christakis 1999). From this perspective, the performative function of clinical disclosure had 
collateral effects beyond expanding Ernestine’s choices or extending her agency.  
Discussion 
Medical anthropologists have long been concerned with understanding how moral agendas, 
state power, and other structural forces are imbricated within the clinical encounter (see, for 
example, Cooper 2015; Gammeltoft 2014; Lazarus 1988; Maternowska 2006; Rivkin-Fish 
2005). I have argued here that linguistic anthropology offers another set of perspectives and 
tools for enhancing medical anthropological theorizing in this arena. Disclosure practices in 
medicine are a particularly productive site for the integration of medical and linguistic 
anthropologies because they reflect cultural norms, values, and assumptions regarding 
clinical communication and communicability. Briggs (2005) introduced ‘communicability’ to 
refer to the productive processes by which disease-related knowledge is differentially 
communicated and received, and the ideological processes that shape and naturalize such 
patterns of distribution. While Briggs is principally concerned with journalism as a form of 
health discourse, public debates on bioethical matters constitute another communicative 
form through which health-related knowledge circulates. My analysis shows that a linguistic 
approach can enhance understandings of these communicative processes and their 
implications for health care, broadly conceived.  
Physicians, bioethicists, and anti-AID activists in Vermont SAID expressed a range of 
concerns about proactively informing patients about AID. They worried that doing so might 
lead to a cascade of harmful consequences, such as damaging the patient-provider 
relationship or influencing the patient’s decision making. These concerns underpin a 
disclosure ideology widely held in contemporary medical ethics that discourages informing 
patients about AID. Beth Neill’s story exemplifies such conventional bioethical concerns 
insofar as it suggests that informing patients about AID can lead to a slippery slope in which 
ineligible patients are repeatedly and inappropriately offered AID in a way that could 
become coercive. 
The two ethnographic vignettes presented here offer a contrasting perspective on the social, 
linguistic, and moral stakes of informing. The Tremblays viewed their physician as simply 
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‘presenting an option’ regarding Arnold’s medical treatment. Cora did not seem concerned 
about the power of suggestion, even though she acknowledged Arnold’s suggestibility. And 
despite Cora’s moral opposition to AID, for her, the foremost disclosure ideology was a 
belief in the patient’s right to information and the importance of retaining end-of-life 
choices. These values were similarly reflected in Dr. Nichols’s disclosure ideology. She felt 
an ethical imperative to maintain the possibility of choice in the face of death, particularly 
given the realities of what she called ‘ugly death’, and was far less concerned with the 
productive potential of such disclosures, even after experiencing harmful effects firsthand.  
In order to understand the risks of disclosure, we need to look beyond the information at 
hand and examine how informing can yield quite different effects across different 
communicative contexts. This point echoes previous anthropological studies highlighting 
how the relational context of medical disclosure can shape and challenge understandings of 
the putative ‘right to information’ (Konrad 2003; Sperling 2008), as well as Norwood’s 
(2009) research affirming the central role of families in euthanasia discussions. 
Conceptualizing disclosure as a performative clinical process reveals how the social effects of 
disclosure unfold in time and space beyond the clinical encounter, in ways that challenge 
conventional bioethical concerns regarding abuse, threats to autonomy, and vulnerability to 
coercion. My analysis suggests other productive possibilities for the power of suggestion, not 
all of them negative. Informing may produce relational challenges outside of the patient-
provider dyad, as we saw with Dr. Nichols. Yet, as we saw with Arnold Tremblay, it may 
also expand one’s range of choices and bolster decisional agency, irrespective of whether the 
patient ultimately pursues AID. Such stakes of disclosure are poorly served by traditional 
bioethical models of moral deliberation and decision making, which emphasize patient 
autonomy above other relevant factors. Instead, an ethnographic approach reveals how the 
moral stakes of disclosure may be marked by ambiguity and uncertainty, inviting a less 
decisive stance on disclosing the option of AID.  
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